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NOTE
AIRPORT DRUG STOPS: DEFINING REASONABLE
SUSPICION BASED ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE DRUG COURIER PROFILE
The fourth. amendment ' prohihits unreasonable searches and seizures by the goy-
eminent and requires that warrants that authorize searches be based on probable cause.'
In construing the demands of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized
three categories of' police-citizen encounters. 5 Each of these categories requires striking a
different balance bet ween the government's need to search and the need to protect
personal privacy,' Included in the first. category of encounters are communications
between police and citizens involving no restraint of liberty or coercion. These encounters
do not implicate t he fourth amendment!' The second category concerns brief, minimally
intrusive investigative stops by police that qualify as seizures'' and that must he supported
by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to meet the requirements of the fourth
amendment.' Involved in the third category are highly intrusive full-scale arrests" that
must be based on probable cause to comply with the fourth aniendment. 9 Although
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not he violated and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to he searched, and the persons or things to he seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
• See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United Slates, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For a
discussion of the scope of conduct protected by the fourth amendment, see infra notes 37-77 and
accompanying text.
3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has described the three tiers or
categories into which Supreme Court decisions dealing with police-citizen encounters fall. See United
States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980, 988 (8th Cir. 1983).
• United States v. I3rignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (reasonableness depends "on a
balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers"); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (reasonableness
test involves "balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails"); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or
seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.").
5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). See infra notes 82 -93 and accompanying text.
• Throughout this note the term "seizure" is used to mean any police-citizen encounter
invoking fourth amendment protections. The level of the appropriate protection will be described in
the text. See infra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
s Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979).
9 "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed [by the person to be
arrested]: " Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160. 175-76 (1948) (quoting Carroll v. United States,
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arrests and investigative stops are seizures within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment,' the Supreme Court has not established a firm boundary between those police-
citizen encounters that warrant fourth amendment protection and those encounters that
do not."
These fourth amendment principles are applied in police-citizen encounters in the
nation's airports as well as other situations. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
has established a program to stop traffic in illicit drugs that involves watching people in
airports based on a drug courier profile. ' 2 Drug courier profiles were initiated by the DEA
in 1974 at. Detroit Metropolitan Airport in an effort to combat escalating drug smuggling
through the nation's airways,' 3 Since this time, the program has spread to more than
twenty major airports around the country." No single drug courier profile is used
nationally. Rather, each DEA airport unit draws on its own experience within the particu-
lar airport to create and modify the characteristics composing the profile.' 5 Among the
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U .S.200,216 (1979). For a description
of the probable cause requirement, see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
10
 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (brief investigatory stop constituted seizure
protected by fourth amendment); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (per curiam) (same);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 16 (1968) (dictum) (accosting individual and restraining freedom consti-
tutes seizure).
" The Court's most recent attempt to resolve this problem was in United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980). In Mendenhall, the Court failed to muster a majority for any proposition
defining "seizure." Justice Stewart writing the plurality opinion concluded that "a person has been
'seized' within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id.
at 554 (plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart in this part of the opinion. Justice
Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment and certain
sections of Justice Stewart's opinion. Although Justice Powell did "not necessarily disagree" with
Justice Stewart's standard for determining when a seizure has occurred, see id. at 560 n.1 (Powell, J.,
concurring), he chose not to reach the issue because he found the seizure in Mendenhall reasonable in
any event. Id. at 565 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. In this dissenting opinion, Justice White attacked
Justice Stewart's reasoning as inconsistent with the Court's earlier decision in Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200 (1979). 446 U.S. at 567-71 (White, J., dissenting). See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
502-03 (1983) (plurality opinion) (adopting Mendenhall standard); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 443
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (Mendenhall issue remained unresolved). Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Reid was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.
" See generally Costantino, Drug Courier Profiles and Airport Stops: Is the Sky the Limit?, 3 W. NEW.
EN c.. L. REV. 175 (1980); Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall and Reid: Analyzing Police
Intrusions On Less Than Probable Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 49 (1981) (same) [hereinafter cited as
Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles]; Greene & Wice, The D.E.A. Drug Profile: History and Analysis, 22 S.
TEx. L.J. 261, 269-79 (1982) (discussing development and use of suspect profiles).
The profile was actually developed in the early 1970's in response to skyjacking. See United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Since then profiles have been used to
identify possible criminal offenders in other settings as well. Profiles have been used to detect
individuals transporting marijuana on trains, see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 397, 398
(9th Cir. 1974); smugglers, see, e.g., United States v. Klein, 592 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1979); car
thieves, see, e.g., State v. Ocha, 112 Ariz. 582, 586, 544 P.2d 1097, 1101 (1976).
See Kadish	 Brofman, Drug Courier Characteristics: A Defense Profile, 15 TRIAL 47, 48 (May
1979).
15 See United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (2d Cir. 1979). In the early days of the
rise of the use of the drug courier profile the characteristics were not written down, nor did agents
have a clear idea of how many and what combination of characteristics was needed to be present for
them to initiate the stop or arrest. United States v. Caleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977). Later
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factors incorporated in the profile are: (I) arrival from or departure to an identified
source city; 16 (2) carrying little or no luggage, or large quantities of empty suitcases; (3)
unusual itinerary, such as a rapid turnaround time for a very lengthy airplane trip; (4) use
of an alias; (5) carrying thousands of dollars of currency, usually on the suspect's person,
in briefcases or bags; (6) purchasing airline tickets with a large amount of small denomi-
nation currency; and (7) unusual nervousness beyond that ordinarily exhibited by
passengers."
In these encounters, DEA agents monitoring airports stop air travelers whose behav-
ior matches a number of characteristics in the drug courier profile and ask to sec their
identification and airline ticket." The encounters often end in a search of the passenger's
person or luggage.° Confrontations between DEA agents and air travelers have resulted
cases indicate that the profile remains unwritten, undefined, and ambiguous. See United States v.
Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) ("The profile has a chameleon-like
quality; it seems to change itself to fit the facts of each case").
" A source city is a city from which DEA agents believe that couriers bring many drugs to a
particular city. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 (1983) (plurality opinion) (Miami source
city for drugs distributed to New York City); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 439 (1980) (per curiam)
(DEA agents testified that Fort Lauderdale is a source city for cocaine distributed throughout the
country); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (1980) (plurality opinion) (DEA agents
believed that Los Angeles is a source city for heroin that couriers bring to Detroit).
' 7 See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc). The Berry court also
detailed what they considered secondary characteristics. These characteristics include:
(I) The almost exclusive use of public transportation, particularly taxicabs, in departing
from the airport; (2) immediately making a telephone call after deplaning; (3) leaving a
false or fictitious call-back telephone number with the airline being utilized; and (4)
excessively frequent travel to source or distribution cities.
Id. at 599. Other characteristics mentioned by the Berry court include: checking to see if followed;
attempting to leave the airport immediately; wearing unusual dress; having luggage with no tags;
and attempting to conceal an association with a fellow traveler. Id. at 598 n.17.
fie See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547-48 & ri.1 (1980) (plurality opinion).
" Typical procedures in which the profile is employed to help detect narcotics couriers and
secure an arrest are set forth in United State v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538-39 (ED. Mich.
1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977). These procedures are as follows:
The agents observe as many incoming flights 	 as time permits. They watch deplaning
passengers, mindful of information given them by airline employees and the results of
their police work. When they spot a suspect who matches some or all of the characteris-
tics in the profile, they watch that person as he or she moves from the plane through the
concourse to the baggage claim area and ground transportation, adding to their store
of information on the individual.
Prior to the person's leaving the airport, the agents decide whether they have a
founded suspicion to stop the suspect. This decision is based upon information ac-
quired from the airline ticket agents, from their independent police work, and from
their observations of the individual as he or she arrives in light of the agent's
accumulated knowledge and personal experience. Occasionally, anonymous tips add to
the agent's knowledge of a traveler.
If agents do not have a founded suspicion that a traveler is a courier, they turn to
other duties. However, if they reasonably suspect a traveler of carrying drugs, they stop
the suspect and ask for identification, including among other things the ticket receipt
on which he or she is traveling. The information garnered from the identification stop
is added to the agent's other information about the suspect and a second decision is
made. The agent at that time either sends the person on his way or informs him of his
suspicion and asks him to accompany the agent to a more private place. In some
instances, this is the baggage claim agent's office; in others, the first-aid office. These
696	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 26: 693
in a significant amount of litigation in the federal courts.' The question arising from
these confrontations is whether the profile characteristics found in a given case support
the stop. To analyze this question, determining into which category of police-citizen
encounters each stop falls is necessary. At. one extreme, if the stop falls into the first
category of police-citizen encounters, then I he drug courier profile is sufficient to support
the stop because at this level the police-citizen encounter is so minimally intrusive that it
does not rise to the level of a fourth amendment seizure. At the other extreme, if t he stop
falls into the third category of police-citizen encounters, then the drug courier profile is
probably insufficient under fourth amendment standards to support the stop because at
this level probable cause is necessary. In drug courier profile cases, the major unsolved
fourth amendment issue, therefore, concerns stops that fall into the second category of
police-citizen encounters — the investigative stop."
Three recent Supreme Court decisions have considered the issue of airport drug
stops based on the drug courier profile without articulating any definite standards to
guide DEA agents in making stops based on the drug courier profile."' In United Slates i..
Mendenhall :23 the Supreme Court considered for the first time the constitutionality of the
drug courier profile but failed to arrive at a conclusive holding." While a five member
are not private rooms but are places somewhat removed from the hustle and bustle of
the baggage claim area, the taxi entrance, and the parking area.
At that time the agent advises the suspect of his constitutional rights, and informs
him of the belief' that he or she is carrying contraband drugs. The agent then requests
permission to examine the suspect's suitcase or other bag. A further warning is some-
times given to the effect that, if the suspect refuses, the agent will proceed immediately
to request a magistrate to issue a search warrant. Occasionally, a request to search
occurs in a more public area .... If the person consents, a search is made. if no consent
is given, the person is formally placed under arrest and the bag is opened without
consent.
409 F. Stipp. at 538-39.
2" See United States v. Nemhhard, 676 F.2d 193,203-04 (6th Cir. 1982) (reasonable suspicion for
stop when nervous defendants arriving front drug source city attempted to discover surveillance,
simulated  telephone calls, apparently tried to conceal their association, exchanged luggage, and
slipped out of the airport); United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802,808 (6th Cir. 1982) (no reasonable
suspicion when defendant arrived from major drug supply center, disembarked early from plane,
followed circuitous route, and appeared nervous); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 137 (7th Cir.
1982) (reasonable suspicion for stop when suspect was first passenger to disembark from plane, had
first class ticket with substantial cash price, had different names on ticket and driver's license,
appeared nervous, and gave implausible story); United States v. Jodoin, 672 F.2d 232, 234-35 (1st
Cir. 1982) (reasonable suspicion for stop when suspect had traveled to drug source city and spent
only 17 hours there before returning, had paid cash for ticket, had given no telephone number to
airline, appeared nervous, used a false name, lied about the length of his stay, and claimed that the
suitcase he was carrying was not his and that he had no extra clothing, identification, or airline
ticket); United States v. Elsoffer, 67! F.2d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 1982) (reasonable suspicion for stop
when front of airline passenger's trousers revealed bulge of unusual size and shape); United States v.
MacDonald, 670 F.2d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 1982) (reasonable suspicion for stop when nervous suspect
traveling from major drug source area checked baggage twice during trip, explained his conduct to
seal companion by improbable story, and left without baggage upon arrival at destination).
See Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, supra note 12, at 66-68.
" See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); United States
v Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
'3
 446 U.S. 544 (1980). See infra notes 105-66 and accompanying text.
" 446 U.S. at 547-56 (plurality opinion). See generally Note, Fourth Amendment —Airport Searches
and Seizures: Where Will the Court Land?, 71 J. CRIM. L. ANn CRIMINOLOGY 499, 501-07 (1980)
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majority held that Mendenhall's consent to an investigation constituted a waiver of her
fourth amendment. protections, the Court split in determining whether she had ever
become entitled to such protection. 25 Three Justices, however, who had assumed that a
seizure had occurred, concluded that the drug courier profile and its application had
established a reasonable suspicion necessary to warrant an investigative stop.'" One month
later, in Reid a, Georgia," a majority of t he Court held in a per curiam opinion that the
defendant's characteristics and behavior that fit four characteristics of a drug courier
profile,'" failed to provide reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop."D In the roost
recent drug courier profile case, Florida v. Royer, 3° however, the plurality rejected a lower
court decision that the drug courier profile is insufficient to provide the reasonable
suspicion required to justify an investigative stop. ► ' The plurality found that the charac-
teristics exhibited by the suspect, all of which were included in the drug courier profile, 32
provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the investigative stop. 33 These three
Supreme Court opinions did not indicate whether, if at all, the profile characteristics were
relied upon in finding an articulatable suspicion in each case. Moreover, because the
validity of profile use in practice varies with each case, the Supreme Court will never draw
any bright lines in this area of fourth amendment law. Nonetheless, by a process of
elimination it is possible to conclude which drug courier profile characteristics provide
reasonable suspicion and which characteristics do not by themselves provide suspicion
necessary to validate an investigative stop. The precise issue on which this note focuses is
whether the second category of police-citizen encounters — investigative stops — can he
justified under fourth amendment jurisprudence because a person exhibits some but not
all of the characteristics contained in the c h ug courier profile.
This note, by examining the three drug courier profile cases deCided by the Supreme
Court t bus far, will suggest that certain characteristics in the drug courier profile need to
be present to provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop.
First, the note explains the three categories of police-citizen encounters identified by the
(analyzing Mendenhall as seminal decision in law of drug courier profile stops) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Airpori Searches and Seizures].
" 446 U.S. at 557 (plurality opinion). Applying the totality of the circumstances test enunciated
in Schneckloth v. Busiamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court concluded that Mendenhall freely and
voluntarily consented to the search. Id. at 557 -60 (plurality opinion).
"" 446 U.S. at 565 (Powell, J., concurring).
27 998 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam). See infra notes 167 -95 and accompanying text.
2" Id. at 440 -41. The four drug courier profile characteristics were: (1) arrival from a source city;
(2) arrival at time diminished law enforcement (early morning); (3) appearance of trying to conceal
that defendant and companion were traveling together; (4) having no luggage other than shoulder
bag. Id.
z" Id.
3" 460 U.S. 491 (1980). See infra notes 196-329 and accompanying text.
3 ' Id. at 495 n.7 (plurality opinion).
32 In Royer's case, the detectives' attention was attracted by the following facts considered to be
within the prtifile.
(a) Royer was carrying American Tourister luggage, which appeared to he heavy, (b) he
was young, apparently between 25-35, (c) he was casually dressed, (d) he appeared pale
and nervous, looking around at other people, (c) he paid for his ticket in cash with a
large number of bills, and (f) rather than completing the airline identification tag to be
attached to checked baggage, which had space for a name, address and telephone
number, Royer wrote only a name and the destination.
Id. at 493 n.2 (plurality opinion).
33 Id. at 502 (plurality opinion).
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Supreme Court and the application of fourth amendment jurisprudence to each cate-
gory. Next, the second category of police-citizen encounters — the investigative stop —
will he examined in more depth. This discussion will include t he historical development. of
the investigative stop and constraints circumscribing the use of the investigative stop
imposed by the fburth amendment. The three drug courier profile cases that have
reached the Supreme Court will then he discussed. These cases are United States v.
Mendenhall, 34 Reid v. Georgia, 35 and Florida v. Royer," This discussion of the three drug
courier profile cases will argue that the Court has given its approval to the use of the drug
courier profile charactistics in the nation's airports to support the second category of
police-citizen encounters — the investigative stop. Since deciding these three cases,
however, the Court has not explicitly stated the guidelines that lower courts should use in
applying fourth amendment jurisprudence to the drug courier profile. Nonetheless, by
examining t he characteristics of each defendant in these three cases it is possible to piece
together the guidelines courts should use in determining whether reasonable suspicion
justified the investigative stop.
1. THE SCOPE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The fourth amendment 37 prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the
government." Courts determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure by balancing
the intrusiveness of the search or seizure against the consequent benefit of such a search
or seizure to the public. 39 The scope of fourth amendment protection against unreason-
able seizures is not easily defined. The Supreme Court has not conclusively delineated
when contact between police and citizens becomes so intrusive that fourth amendment.
34 446 U.S. 544 (1980). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 105-66 and accompanying
text.
° 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 167-195 and
accompanying text.
3" 460 U.S. 491 (1983). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 196-329 and accompanying
text.
'1 See supra note I for text of the fourth amendment.
3" The term "government" also refers to administrative searches. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981) (fourth amendment protections extend to mine inspections under federal
statute); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504-05 (1978) (fourth amendment protections extend m
searches of fire-gutted building by inspectors).
The fourth amendment does not apply, however, to intrusions by private individuals. Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 473-75 (1921) (fourth amendment inapplicable when former employee
took papers incriminating discharged employee from office safe and desk and turned them over to
the Justice Department); United States v. Jennings, 653 F.2d 107,4'110 (4th Cir. 1981) (fourth
amendment inapplicable when private airline security agent searched package for drugs after
receiving a tip from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), even though DEA agent was
present at the search). The fourth amendment does apply, however, to private persons if the private
persons are regarded as an instrument or an agent of the state. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 903
U.S. 443, 487-88 (1971).
1" See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (reasonableness test involves
"balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails"); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (reasonableness depends "on a balance between the public
interest and, the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers").
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jurisprudence applies." Although the Court has not defined the exact point where a
police-citizen encounter is subject to fourth amendment jurisprudence, it has divided
these police-citizen encounters into three categories. 4 ' These three categories are: stops
for questioning, 42 investigative stops," and full scale arrests." The first category, stops for
questioning, are generally the least intrusive encounters." These stops usually involve the
approach and questioning of a willing person in a public place and are devoid of
detention and coercion." Stops for questioning are not considered seizures under the
fourth amendment." The second category, art investigative stop, usually involves an
intermediate level of intrusion." Such a stop must be supported by reasonable, specific,
articulatable suspicion, a standard less than probable cause, and may be accompanied by a
limited search of the suspect for weapons." If unreasonable in length or purpose, an
investigative stop may become an arrest. 5° The third category, an arrest, is the most
intrusive encounter. An arrest exists when a police officer forcibly deprives a person of
liberty by taking that person into custody and subjecting the person to a thorough
search. 51 To effect a valid arrest, the police must have probable cause. 52 Probable cause
exists when, at the time the arrest is made, 53 the facts and circumstances within the
officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient
to lead a prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an
40 Royer, 460 U.S. at 506 (plurality opinion) (no "litmus paper" test for distinguishing consensual
encounters from seizure or for determining when seizure exceeds bounds of investigative stop).
1 ' 460 U.S. at 498-500 (plurality opinion) (defining three categories of police-citizen encoun-
ters).
' 2 See, e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551-54 (plurality opinion).
See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
" See, e.g., Royer, 460 U.S. at 489-99 (plurality opinion); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
212-13, 216 (1979).
4 ' See, e.g., United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 496-98 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979) ("arguably" no fourth
amendment seizure whets police follow suspect from airport and question suspect on street, and
suspect denies ownership of bag carried from airport); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1042
(5th Cir. 1979) (no seizure when federal narcotics agents, without showing force or physical contact,
approach citizen for identification at airport; seizure occurs when agents take ticket to verify suspect's
response).
" United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 501 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d
1036, 1041 (5th Cir. 1979). -
' 7 United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 501 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d
1036, 1041 (5th Cir. 1979).
" See, e.g., United States v. Hammond, 666 F.2d 435, 437 (9th Cir. 1982) (investigative stop
when police officers ordered defendant to get out and place hands on back of car); United States v.
Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir. 1981) (investigative stop when Coast Guard officers ordered
freighter to stop, enforced order by firing shots in front of its bow, and boarded freighter); United
States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1002 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 948 (1982) (investigative
stop when undercover agent pointed gun at defendant and ordered him to stop after agent
perceived immediate threat of harm to his partner); United State; v. Tate, 648 F.2d 939, 941 (4th
Cir.1981) (investigative stop when detectives ordered defendant to pull car over to check defendant's
license and registration).
" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
5" See id. at 21-22 (only reasonable suspicion necessary to justify "stop and frisk" because
intrusion less severe than that of traditional arrest).
" See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 90-91 (1964).
" See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 92 (1964).
sa See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (probable cause must
exist at moment of arrest).
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offense." Although courts do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, an officer's
mere suspicion of criminal activity is insufficient to establish• probable cause. 55
As a general rule, courts prefer that a neutral and detached magistrate, rather than a
law enforcement. officer on the street., determine the existence of probable cause required
to justify searches of property belonging to persons suspected of engaging in criminal
activity, as well as arrests.' If the judge or magistrate concludes on the basis of probative
evidence' that probable cause exists, both to link the person or items sought to the
criminal activity and to indicate that the person or items will be found in the place to be
searched, then the judge will issue a warrant." A search or seizure conducted without this
warrant is presumptively unreasonable," although the presumption may be overcome in
a number of narrowly defined situations." Traditionally, although warrants were not
required in all circumstances,''' the requirement. of probable cause was treated as an
" Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). For recent cases in which courts have not found
probable cause to arrest and consequently invalidated the arrest and subsequent search, see, e.g.,
United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 808 (6th Cir. 1982) (no probable cause to arrest defendant
when defendant left plane arriving from major drug supply center among first passengers and
walked through terminal, taking circuitous route and looking about in nervous fashion); United
States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1982) (no probable cause to arrest when defendant
exhibited' characteristics of drug courier profile, defendant had previous narcotics conviction, and
was suspected of smuggling drugs from Colombia, airline ticket indicated use of an alias, and
detector dogs showed some interest in but did not attack a checked bag).
` 5 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969) (only the probability and not a prima
facie showing of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause); see also Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175 (1948) (mere suspicion insufficient to give probable cause).
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981); United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). See Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500,
507 (4th Cir. 1981) (dictum) (warrant supported by probable cause and issued by neutral and
detached magistrate generally required f'or valid search). In reviewing the validity of a warrant issued
by a magistrate, the court will consider only the information that had been brought to the magis-
trate's attention at the time he issued the warrant. United States v. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843, 845 (11th
Cir. 1982).
5.7 Black's Law Dictionary defines probative evidence as follows; "In the law of evidence, having
the effect of proof, tending to prove, or actually proving. Testimony carrying quality of proof and
having fitness to induce conviction of truth, consisting of fact and reason cooperating or coordinate
factors." Bt.nex's LAW DICTIONARY 1082 (5th ed. 1979).
w 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 441-43 (1978).
59 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977). Courts do not require an impartial
judicial determination of probable cause for public felony arrest if the arresting officer himself
validly determines that he has probable cause to arrest. In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976), for example, the Supreme Court endorsed the common law rule that police may make a
warrantless public felony arrest based solely on probable cause. Id. at 414, 421-22; accord United
States v. Collins, 668 F.2d 819, 820-21 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (statute authorizing Secret Service
agents to make a warrantless arrest codifies common law rule reaffirmed in Watson); United States v.
Robertson, 650 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1980) (exigent circumstances not constitutionally required to
justify warrantless arrest in public place when probable cause exists), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1100
(1981); United States v. Tate, 648 F.2d 939, 943 (4th Cir. 1981) (warrantless public felony arrest
when license check revealed that car defendant was driving was stolen).
The police are often thought to have a vested interest in conducting searches. The magistrate,
therefore, acts as a buffer between the police officer, who is "engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime." Steagald,, 451 U.S. at 212.
6° For a discussion of these limited exceptions, see infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text..
n See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416-19 (1976) (felony arrests in public places);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (hot pursuit).
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absointe. 62
 Thus, the standard of probable cause represented the minimum justification
necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest reasonable under I he fourth
amendment.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has propounded exceptions to the fourth
amendment. requirement of a warrant based on probable cause." Situations in which a
warrant is not required tinder fourth amendment. jurisprudence can be grouped into
three types of exceptions: consent searches; routine searches of nonsuspects; and
searches of criminal suspects justified by circumstances that. make obtaining a warrant
impracticable." The consent. exception to the warrant. rule has free and volunta ry consent
as its most basic requirement."' Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from
the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the case." The "routine search" excep-
tion, by contrast, rests upon public policy considerations of protecting the community.
This exception involves instances where no reason exists to suspect particular persons of
criminal activity, but protection of people and property requires routine searches.'''
62 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975) (value of probable cause, as standard for
arrest under the fourth amendment, is a necessary accommodation between individual's right to
privacy and state's duty to control crime).
63 See generally C. WHITERREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Ax ANALYSIS OE CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
AND CONCEVTS § 4.03, at 108 (1980). -
"' Professor Amsterdam, Professor of Law, Stanford University, has so conceptualized the
exceptions to the warrant rule. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN, L. REV.
349, 358-60 (1974).
Schneckloth v. Bitstamonie, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Only a person with the authority and
capacity to waive fourth amendment guarantees can consent to a warrantless search. See, e.g., United
States v, Ochoa-Aimanza, 623 F.2d 676, 677-78 (10th Cir. 1980) (six-year old child lacked capacity
and authority to waive ihurth ;intendment rights of the occupants of the house). For the consent to a
search to be effective, the agents conducting the search must know that consent was given. See United
States v. Glashy, 576 F.2d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 854 (1979) (government
cannot rely on consent to search when agents who forced entry into apartment unaware that
defendant had granted consent to other agents).
The scope of a consent search may not exceed the limitations or purposes agreed to by the
person giving consent. See Gould v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 310 (1921) (consent for business
acquaintance to wait in office does not constitute consent to acquaintance's extensive search of office
on behalf of the state).
66 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 212, 223-24 (1973) (totality of the circumstances
determines voluntariness of consent). Factors relevant to this determination include the following.
First, the circumstances under which the defendant came into custody is relevam,see Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at 559 (plurality opinion) (surroundings of DEA office, where search conducted, not inherently
coercive when defendant agreed to go there). Second, the defendant's awareness of the right to
withhold consent is relevant, see id. at 558-59 (plurality opinion) (knowledge of right to refuse search
highly relevant to determination of consent). The Supreme Court, however, has held that knowledge
of the right to withhold consent is not a prerequisite to voluntary consent. Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 212, 234 (1973). Third, the defendant's performance of cooperative acts is
relevant, .see United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 1982) (consent voluntary when arrestee
not coerced or physically restrained opened automobile trunk for the DEA agent). Fourth, the
defendant's age, intelligence and education are relevant, see Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558 (plurality
opinion) (race, age, sex and level of education are relevant to determination of consent; 22 year old
black female with eleventh grade education plainly capable of knowing consent). Finally, the nature
of the police behavior is relevant, see Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968)
(consent faulty when police falsely claimed possession of a warrant).
" One example of such a warrantless search is a random search of persons crossing the border
into the United States and their vehicles, luggage, and other personal effects, because of the need to
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Finally, the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant rule concerns situations
where a warrant procedure would be fruitless or impracticable, such as when law en-
forcement officers confront criminal suspects or encounter criminal evidence. The strong
public policy interest in apprehending criminals and evidence permits this warrantless
search in a number of limited situations." One of these circumstances is the investigative
stop, which is the major focus of this note."
If a government official conducts a search or seizure unsupported by probable
cause,"' or if' the situation does not fall under one of the exceptions to t he warrant rule, 7 t
then a violation of the fourth amendment has occurred. 72 Violations of fourth amend-
ment proscriptions against. unreasonable searches or seizures are redressed by application
of the exclusionary rule." The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of any evidence
that is either the direct 74 or indirect product of illegal police conduct.," The indirect.
enforce custom and immigration laws. See United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir.
1982) (border search does not require probable cause because it is derived from right to control who
and what may enter the country). Another example of a warrantless search is a search of an airline
passenger prior to hoarding due to the danger of air piracy. See United States v. Skipworth, 482 F.2d
,I272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973) (travelers who present themselves for boarding on an airplane, like those
seeking entrance into the country, are subject to a search based on mere or unsupported suspicion).
A further example of a warrantless search is a search of vehicles lawfully in police custody to
safeguard property inside vehicles from loss. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 F.2d 364, 368.72,
375-76 (1976) (car impounded for parking violations may be searched). Finally, searches of business
premises licensed to distribute regulated items such as liquor and firearms are permitted without
warrants. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 314 (1971) (firearms); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v, United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-76 (1970) (liquor).
" A warrant is not required in several situations because the resort to the warrant procedure
would he fruitless or impracticable. One of these situations is a search incident to a valid arrest. See
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (authority to search a person incident to arrest
depends on the need of the police to disarm the suspect and to discover evidence). Another situation
falling under this exception to the warrant requirement is the seizure of items in plain view. See
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 903 U.S. 433, 446 (1971) (plurality opinion) (the plum view exception to
the warrant requirement permits the seizure of evidence seen by the police when they have prior
independent justification for being present at the point of observation, when the perceived items'
evidential value is readily apparent, and when the discovery of evidence is inadvertent). The police
may also conduct a warrantless search due to exigent circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (to prevent destruction of evidence); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 447 (1973) (to protect the public); United States v. Mesa, 660 F.2d 1070, 1078 (5th Cir. 1981),
reh'g and reh'g en bane denied, 667 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1981) (to protect themselves). Another example
where a warrantless search is permitted is the search of vehicles. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
761 (1979). The final example where a warrantless search is permitted is an investigative stop. Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
69
 For a discussion of this exceptions to the warrant requirement, see infra notes 79-96 and
accompanying text.
" See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
72 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
73 The exclusionary rule is a judicially created doctrine. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (evidence seized in violation of defendant's fourth amendment rights excluded from state
criminal trial); United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (evidence seized in violation of
defendant's fourth amendment rights excluded from criminal trial). For a discussion of the rule, see
Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More
Than An Empty Blessing, 62 JunicATuRE 337, 343-44 (1979); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an
"Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 67-68 (1978).
" Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 39 (1979) (evidence directly seized pursuant to a search
incident to an invalid arrest is commonly viewed as an illegal search in itself).
" The indirect evidence or fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was first applied in Silverthorne
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product of the illegal police conduct, also known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
however, may be admitted if the government demonstrates t hat this indirect evidence was
discovered independently of the dii-ect evidence.'" Recently, the Supreme Court nar-
rowed the scope of the exclusionary rule by creating a "good-faith" exception. This
exception has two aspects. First, if a police officer reasonably relied on a warrant that later
is found to be invalid, the evidence will no longer be barred from use in the prosecution's
case-in-chief." Second, evidence will be admitted even if it was obtained pursuant to a
warrant that failed to provide an accurate description of the items to be seized."
THE INVESTIGATIVE STOP: TERRY V. 01-110 AND ITS PROGENY
An investigative stop, the second category of police-citizen encounters, is a seizure
not rising to the level of an arrest." Such a stop is permitted in circumstances where
probable cause is lacking, but the officer is able to articulate specific facts and inferences
that lead to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." A stop based on reasonable
suspicion may become an arrest if unreasonable in length or purpose, and is then valid
only if supported by probable cause."
Terry v. Ohio is the leading case in applying fourth amendment jurisprudence to the
investigative stop." In Terry," the Court recognized for the first time that the fourth
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). justice Holmes' description of the concept and the
limits of its use is still instructive:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not he used before the Court but that it shall not
be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred
and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may
be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong
cannot be used by it in the way proposed.
Id. at 392.
" See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963). Not all evidence is fruit of the
poisonous tree just because it would not have been discovered but for the primary illegality. The test
is " 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence ... has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.' " Id. at 488 (quoting J. MACU1RE, EVIDENCE OF GUI1,T 221 (1959)).
" 
United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3905 (1984).
" Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 109 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
79 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1979) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 16-19
(1968)).
B° Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
" Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210-12 (1979) (finding arrest occurred because police
restrained suspect's liberty beyond brief intrusion entailed by an investigatory stop). See generally
Chapter, Appellate Decisions, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 211 (1980) (discussing importance of determining scope
of investigative detention) [hereinafter cited as Chapter, Appellate Decisions).
82 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
" In Terry, a plainclothes policeman observed three men who appeared to he casing a store for a
hold-up. Id. at 5. When the officer approached the men and asked what they were doing, one of the
suspects "mumbled something." Id. at 6-7. Suspecting imminent danger, the officer grabbed the
defendant, spun him around, patted down the outside of his clothing, and discovered a concealed
weapon. Id. at 7.
In the companion case to Terry, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Court avoided the
resolution of the seizure issue because the record was unclear. Id. at 68.
See generally LaFave, Street Encounters and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REV, 40, 51 (1968); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 181 (1968).
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amendment protects individuals from certain police activities even though such activities
are less intrusive than arrests and full searches." The reasonableness of such lesser
intrusions, the Terry Court stated, is determined by balancing the individual's privacy
interests against the state's interest in effective crime prevention and detection, and
against law enforcement agents' more immediate interest in protecting themselves and
other potential victims of violence."
The Terry Court believed it had set out a narrow exception to the general require-
ment. of probable cause." The Court liMited its decision to stop and frisk situations
initiated to prevent a crime." In Terry, the Court. held that when a law enforcement officer
has reason to believe that a suspect is armed and dangerous and nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter dispels that suspicion, the officer may act to ensure his and others'
safety during the investigation by conducting a carefully limited protective search of the
suspects outer clothing. 88
Although the Terry Court brought the stop and frisk procedure within the purview of
fourth amendment protection, it did not consider the constitutional propriety of an
investigative seizure for the purpose of detem ion and interrogation." Four years later, in
l Prior to Terry, unreasonable search and seizure analysis was based on arrest, probable cause
for arrest, and warrants based on probable cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207 -08
(1979).
The Terry Court itself recognized that it was dealing in a new area of police activity. 392 U.S. at
9 - 10. See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 153 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In balancing the two interests, the Court stated that a court must "'focus upon the gov-
ernmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen,'" for there is " 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other
than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search for seizure]
" Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 - 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37
(1967)) (brackets in original).
The balancing process weighs three factors: t he public interest of the intrusion, the extent of the
intrusion into one's privacy, and the extent the intrusion advances public interest. See Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 - 51 (1978); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1978).
See generally Chapter, Appellate Decisions, supra note 81, at 213 (Terry Court employed balancing
test to weight degree of intrusion against need of intrusion because the Court recognized that police
must have a "set of flexible responses"); Chapter, Constitutional Law, 10 Got,nEN CATE L. REV. 112,
114 (1980) (Terry rationale allows police greater flexibility because it adopts sliding scale model of
fourth amendment requirements).
g6 Specifically, the Court held that an investigative stop and frisk is a reasonable police practice
"where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Under these circumstances, the Court said
that the police officer is entitled to "conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him," Id. Other cases have
mentioned the limited nature of the Terry stop. See, e.g., Marra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979);
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 21(1 (1979).
" Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
" Id. at 30-31.
" Id. at 19 n.16. The Terry Court stated: "We thus decide nothing today concerning the
constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of
'detention and/or interrogation.'" Id. See Chapter, Appellate Decisions, supra note 81, at 227 (Terry
rationale standing alone not applicable to police detentions not involving frisk of suspect's person).
In dictum, however, the Court approved of seizures in certain circumstances based upon "reasonable
suspicion." 392 U.S. at 22. The Court stated that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Id.
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Adams v. Williams," the Court extended Terry by applying the reasonable suspicion
standard to a police officer's stop of a suspect and seizure of his weapon."' The Court held
that a "brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status. quo momentarily' while obtaining more information, may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." 9' Consequently, after
Adams, theTerry standard has been applied to the detention of suspects and prevention of
crimes."
According to this reasonable suspicion standard developed in Terry and applied in
Adams, a police officer is justified in stopping an individual for interrogation on the basis
of "specific and articulatable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion."' Reasonable suspicion is raised by actions
that, although apparently innocent in themselves to the untrained observer, could be
interpreted by the officer, in light of his experience, to merit further investigation."s Mere
inarticulable hunches, however, are insufficient to meet this standard. 9" In sum, for
purposes of fourth amendment analysis, the Supreme Court has recognized three catego-
ries of police-citizen encounters. At the first level are police-citizen encounters involving
no restraint. on freedom of movement through physical force or show of authority that do
not. trigger fourth amendment protection."' At the second level are brief investigative
stops that a court will uphold based on the totality of circumstances if the detaining
officers . have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal act ivity." 98 At the third level are detentions so intrusive that probable
cause is necessary to validate them."
The stopping of an individual at an airport. by DEA agents or other law enforcement
authorities because the individual's behavior matches a number of characteristics in the
drug courier profile may implicate these fourth amendment considerations.'" if the stop
falls within the first level of police-citizen encounters it is considered so minimally
intrusive that it does not rise to the level of a fourth amendment. seizure.'"' The stop is
'" 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
91 Id. at 145-46. In Adams, a police officer, acting on an informant's tip, approached the
defendant's car, tapped on the window, and asked the defendant to open the door. Id. at 144-45. The
defendant rolled down the window instead, and the officer reached in and removed a gun from the
defendant's waistband, exactly where the informant said it would he Located. Id. at 145. A search
incident to the subsequent arrest uncovered drugs and illegally possessed weapons. Id.
92 Id. at 146.
See, e.g.. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), which involved federal agents'
use of roving border patrols to detect the smuggling of illegal aliens across the Mexican border. Id. at
876-77. In a holding similar to Terry and Adams, the Court found that the government's interest
outweighed the minimal intrusion into personal privacy that t he official conduct created. Id. at 881.
Although the Court disapproved of the random stopping of automobiles, it held that federal border
patrol agents may constitutionally seize an individual motorist when they stop a vehicle after forming
a reasonable suspicion that t he vehicle contains aliens illegally entering the country. Id. at 882-84.
" Adams, 407 U.S. at 145-46.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
99 Id. at 22.
97 ,Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551-54 (plurality opinion).
98 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417.18 (1981).
" Royer, 460 U.S. at 498-99 (plurality opinion); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13,
216 (1979).
th° See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
'"I See .copra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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thus valid even if the officer had no reason to stop the individual. If the stop falls into the
second category of police-citizen encounters, the investigative stop, reasonable suspicion
is necessary to justify the stop and an accompanying limited search under the principles
enunciated in Adams and Terry.'" If the encounter falls into the third category, probable
cause is necessary to justify the stop and any search conducted incident to the stop. 103
The Supreme Court has rendered three decisions concerning the constitutional
validity of the use of the drug courier profile: Mendenhall, Reid, and Royer. Each of these
cases involved the investigation of suspected drug smugglers in airports who were singled
out because they exhibited characteristics found in the drug courier profiles. These
decisions failed to articulate explicitly what profile characteristics are necessary to find the
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the investigative stop. 104 Nonetheless, after
analyzing the characteristics in Mendenhall, Reid, and Royer it is possible to hypothesize
what characteristics are necessary to support an investigative stop. The following section
will analyze each of the Court's drug courier profile cases to date and explain which
characteristics of the profile must be present to establish the reasonable suspicion neces-
sary to justify the investigative stop.
III. ANALYSIS OF TIIE SUFFICIENCY OF DRUG COURIER PROFILE CHARACTERISTICS TO
PROVIDE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY AN INVESTIGATIVE STOP
A. United States v. Mendenhall
In United States a, Mendenhallm the Supreme Court considered for the first time the
fourth amendment ramifications of airport drug stops based on the drug courier
profile."' The issue before the Court was whether sufficient cause to justify an investiga-
tive stop is provided because a traveler matched certain characteristics of the drug courier
profile.'"' Although the Court held that the "stop" of the defendant was constitutional, it
failed to muster a majority to agree on the rationale upholding the constitutionality of the
stop.' {" The decision thus provided little information to guide the lower courts in ruling
on the validity of stops based on the drug courier profile.'
In Mendenhall, two DEA agents observed a woman leaving a plane at. the Detroit
Metropolitan Airport.'"' The agents, believing the woman's behavior fit a drug courier
profile,"' approached her, identified themselves as federal agents, and asked to see her
101 See supra notes 48-50 and 79-93 and accompanying test.
70' See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
1 "4 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
'" 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
th° See generally Note, supra note 24, at 501-07 (analyzing Mendenhall as seminal decision in law of
drug courier profile stops).
'°' The majority consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, Powell and
Blackmun.
See 446 U.S. at 547-48 (Stewart, J., minority opinion in part); id. at 546 (Burger, C.J., Powell
and Blackmun, j. J., joining in part of Justice Stewart's opinion).
1" See id. at 547.48 (Stewart, J., minority opinion in part); id. at 546 (Burger, C.J., Powell and
Blackmun, j.j., joining in part of Justice Stewart's opinion).
11° Id. at 547 (plurality opinion). The plane originated in Los Angeles which is considered a
source city.
"' Id. at 547 n.1 (plurality opinion). According to the agents, the defendant attracted their
attention because she had arrived on a flight from Los Angeles, a major source of heroin brought to
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identification and airplane ticket.'" Her identification bore her true name, but the
airplane ticket was issued in another name." 3 The agents returned her identification and
asked her to accompany them to the DEA office for further questioning. "4 She accom-
panied the agents to the office and once there consented to a body search."' Upon
discovering heroin in her clothing, the agents placed Mendenhall under arrest." 6
Prior to trial, Mendenhall moved to suppress the introduction into evidence of the
heroin obtained in the body search in the DEA office on the ground that the evidence
obtained was the product of an unconstitutional search."' Conceding both that Men-
denhall had been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment and that probable
cause had not existed and no warrant had been obtained for the ensuing search, the
government contended that Mendenhall had consented." 8 The district court. denied the
defendant's motion to suppress."' According to the court, the agent's approach and
request for information was a permissible investigative stop"" and the defendant. had not
been placed under arrest nor otherwise detained when she accompanied the agents to
their office "voluntarily and in the spirit of apparent cooperation." 2 ' The court con-
cluded that the consent to search was freely and voluntarily given.' 22 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the initial stop of Men-
denhall was impermissible because it was not based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. In the alternative, the court found that even if the initial stop was permissible, the
officer's request that Mendenhall accompany them to their private office constituted an
arrest without probable cause.'" Additionally, the Sixth Circuit found that the consent
Detroit. Id. She appeared nervous and was the last person to leave the plane. She "scanned" the
whole area. Id. She proceeded past the baggage area without retrieving any luggage, and she
changed to a different airline for a departing flight. Id.
The attorneys for. Mendenhall argued in their brief that passengers commonly transfer airlines
boarding a connecting flight that departs from a stop-over point. Id. They also argued that often no
opportunity arises for air travelers to claim luggage when they are merely deplaning before changing
airlines to continue their trip. Id. The original carrier usually transfers the luggage of its passenger
directly to the airline that will fly the passengers to their final destination. Id.
71 Id. at 547-48 (plurality opinion).
"3 Id. at 548 (plurality opinion). Mendenhall's driver's license used her real name. Id. Her
airline ticket was issued in the name of "Annette Ford." Id. When Mendenhall was questioned as to
the discrepancy, she said that she lust felt like using that name." /d. Further questioning revealed
that she had been in California only two days. Id. The agents then identified themselves as federal
narcotics agents, at which point Mendenhall became very nervous. Id.
"4 Id.
1 " Id. at 548-49 (plurality opinion). Once in the DEA office, one of the agents asked Mendenhall
if she would, permit a search of her handbag and person. Id. The agent informed her that she had the
right to refuse, but she nevertheless agreed to the search. Id. A -strip search uncovered two small
packages of heroin. Id.
"" Id. at 549 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 549 & n.2 (plurality opinion). The district court's decision was unreported.
"" Id. at 550-51 (plurality opinion).
ill' Id. at 549 (plurality opinion).
110
 The Mendenhall Court found the stop permissible under both Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I
(1968), and United States v. B rig no Ili- Ponce , 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 446 U.S. at 549 (plurality opinion).
11 ' 446 U.S. at 549 (plurality opinion).
111
1" Id. at 549-50 Sc n.2 (plurality opinion) (noting that the opinion of the court of appeals was
also unreported).
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was not voluntary, primarily because the court deemed the consent to be the fruit. of an
illegal detention. ''
The government appealed to the Supreme Court. In a five-to-four decision the
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.' 23
 Chief' Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist, Powell, and Blackmun, joined Justice Stewart's opinion, finding that the
defendant had voluntarily accompanied the agents anti consented to the search.'"' These
five Justices also held that the seizure was constitutional, but. all five did not agree on a
rationale.' 27
 Only Justice Rehnquist joined the part. ()I' Justice Stewart's opinion conclud-
ing that the stop was constitutional because the defendant had not been seized.'" Justice
Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judg-
ment., assumed the stop did constitute a seizure, but lOund it constitutional because the
officers had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaging in criminal activit y." 9
Justice Stewart., in the part of his opinion joined only by Justice Rehnquist, argued
that no seizure had occurred when the defendant was approached by the agents in the
airport concourse, asked for identification, and asked a few questions. 11 Justice Stewart
viewed the events merely as a police-citizen encounter that did not violate any constitu-
tionally protected interest.' 3 ' In reaching this conclusion, he noted that nothing in the
Constitution prevents a "peace officer - from addressing questions to anyone on the
streets or in an airport.' 32 Because Justice Stewart ruled that no seizure had occurred, he
did not reach the issue of whet her a defendant's conduct matching the drug courier
profile would provide reasonable suspicion when a seizure did take place.''''' He went on
to agree with the district court's finding that no arrest had taken place when the defen-
dant was asked to go to the DEA office and that the defendant's subsequent consent to the
search was voluntary. 1 M1'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell did not address Justice Stewart's contention
that a seizure had not occurred because this issue had not been considered by the courts
below.m 3 Justice Powell assumed that the initial encounter constituted a fourth amend-
ment seizure for purposes of his opinion.'" This assumption allowed Justice Powell to
consider whether the characteristics from the drug courier profile that the defendant
exhibited provided a reasonable suspicion to justify t he investigative stop. 137
 He con-
' 24 Id. at 549 - 50 (plurality opinion). On rehearing en hate, the court of appeals reaffirmed its
original decision. 596 17 .2d 706, 707 (6111. Cir. 1979) (en haute). See supra notes 75 - 76 for a discussion
of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
' 25 446 U.S. at 560 (plurality opinion).
' 2" Id. at 558 (plurality opinion).
" 7 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Powell refused to join the part of Justice
Stewart's majority opinion that found no seizure had occurred. 446 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., concur-
ring).
1 28 Id. at 546 (Stewart, J., minority opinion in part).
128 Id. at 563-64 (Powell, J., concurring).
"" Id. at 555-56 (Stewart, J., minority opinion in part),
131 Id. Justice Stewart thought that this was a level -one encounter that did not implicate the
fourth amendment. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
132 hi, at 552 (Stewart, J., minority opinion in part).
' 13 Id. at 551 (Stewart, J., minority opinion in part).
1 ' Id. at 555 - 56 (Stewart, J., minority opinion in part).
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eluded that the drug courier profile and its application had established a reasonable
suspicion that Mendenhall was involved in criminal activity sufficient to warrant the
investigative stop.' 38
In analyzing the reasonableness of the stop, Justice Powell first found that a strong
public interest. was served by the seizure, 139 stating that "[Ole public has a compelling
interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit."'" He
then found that the nature and scope of the intrusion in this case was quite modest."'
Justice Powell noted that the slop was made in a public area near airline employees from
whom she could have sought aid if she was in danger."' The officers, moreover, ques-
tioned the defendant only briefly, did not physically restrain her, and did not display
weapons.' 43 Considering these factors, Justice Powell found that "[title respondent could
not reasonably have felt frightened or isolitted from assistance.' 144
Just ice Powell then discussed the drug courier prof ile." 5 He commented that statistics
showed that the profile program was successful in apprehending drug smugglers. 14" He
then noted that the drug enforcement agents were specially trained to combat drug
distribution and that the agents' knowledge of drug dealers' methods may be relied on to
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.' 47 After discussing the agents' years
of experience with drug traffic, Justice Powell evaluated the conduct of the defendant
actually observed by the agents."s He went through each of the characteristics that. the
agent observed and accepted the agent's assessment that each of these characteristics was
a legitimate characteristic for identifying a drug courier. 19 In t he opinion, Justice Powell
never discussed whether these characteristics were distinguishable from innocent con-
duct.'s" Instead, Justice Powell emphasized that the agents were specially trained to detect
drug couriers' 5 ' and indicated that conduct of the defendant, which may have appeared
innocent. to a layman, might have an entirely different meaning to a trained law enforce-
ment official.'" Justice Powell, however, did riot completely endorse the use of the profile
in all airport drug stops. 153 Reasonable suspicion, indicated Justice Powell, may riot be
provided by reliance upon the drug courier profile itself. 154 Rather, suggested Justice
Powell, "each case raising a Fourth Amendment issue must be judged on its own facts.'
"g Id. at 563-64 (Powell, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 561 (Powell, J., concurring).
'° Id.
141 Id.
 at 565 (Powell, J., concurring).
"2 Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring).
P" Id.
194 Id .
'" Id. at 563-65 (Powell, J., concurring).
"6 Id. at 564 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
"7 Id. at 564 (Powell, J., concurring). The agent who initiated the stop and questioning of the
defendant had ten years of experience in drug enforcement. Id.
"6 Id. at 564-65 (Powell, J., concurring).
"9 Id. The characteristics identified by the DEA agent and testified to at trial to be typical of
drug couriers included nervous behavior, last to deplane, scanning gate area, claiming no baggage,
and changing planes. Id.
"° Id.
151 Id. at 563, 565 (Powell, J., concurring).
1.52 Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring).
159 Id. at 565 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
154 Id .
' 55 Id.
710	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 26: 693
In sum, justice Powell found that the defendant's conduct in Mendenhall, which matched
several characteristics in the drug courier profile, had established the reasonable suspi-
cion necessary to justify the investigative stop.'"
Justice White, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens assumed, just as Justice Powell had, that a seizure had occurred when Mendenhall
was stopped by the agents. 157
 Unlike the concurring Justices, however, the dissenting
Justices believed that the seizure was unlawful because the officers lacked the requisite
"reasonable suspicion" for an investigative stop. 158
 Justice White found that Mendenhall's
conduct was "the kind of behavior that could reasonably be expected of anyone changing
planes in an airport terminal." 159
 Like Justice Powell, Justice White did not analyze the
conduct exhibited by the defendant and observed by the agent s.' 99
 In Justice White's view,
the agents' observations that Mendenhall was the last person to deplane from a flight
originating in a "major source city," that Mendenhall claimed no luggage and changed
airlines, were insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion. 16 ' Justice White concluded that
these characteristics could be attributed to purely innocent behavior and therefore the
agents' belief that the defendant was a drug courier could be based only on " 'his inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion' or 'hunch. ' "162
The Court in Mendenhall considered the constitutionality of seizing passengers on the
basis of their conformance with the profile, but failed to arrive at a conclusive holding. ' 63
Two members of t he majority did not consider the constitutionality of the drug courier
profile because they found no seizure and thus no fourth amendment protection.'" The
remaining three members of the majority declined to address the seizure issue specifically
but assumed that a justifiable seizure had Occurred in light of Mendenhall's conformance
with the drug courier profile.'" The four dissenters found the stop to be a seizure and
concluded that conformance with the profile, without other facts did not provide the
requisite justification for a seizure.'" In sum, three Justices found articulatable suspicion
based on the profile and four Justices found articulatable suspicion lacking based on t he
profile. Thus, after Mendenhall, the constitutionality of seizing airplane passengers on the
basis of their conformance with the drug courier profile was in doubt. The next drug
courier profile case decided by the Court, Reid v. Georgia, did little to alleviate this
confusion.
1" Id. at 565 (Powell, J., concurring).
157 446 U.S. at 565 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White criticized Justice Stewart for reversing
the judgment of the court of appeals on the basis of a fact-bound standard which the defendant did
not litigate in the lower court. Id. at 570-71 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 572 (White, J., dissenting).
' 59 Id.
1" Id. at 572-73 (White, J., dissenting).
"' Id.
162 Id. at 573 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at '27).
' 63 Id. at 547-56 (plurality opinion). See United States v. Palvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1154 (5th Cir.
1980) (Mendenhall did not resolve seizure issue); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1214 (5th
Cir. 1980) (Mendenhall not dispositive on seizure issue).
1" 446 U.S. at 555-60 (plurality opinion). Justice Stewart joined by Justice Rehnquist offered
this perspective.
' 65 Id. at 560 & n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun offered this perspective.
"6 446 U.S. at 566 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens offered this perspective.
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B. Reid v. Georgia
One month after the Mendenhall decision, the Supreme Court in Reid v. Georgia again
considered the constitutionality of airport drug stops. 67 In Reid, the Court held in an
eight-to-one per curiam opinion, that the defendant's characteristics and behavior corre-
sponding to characteristics set forth in the drug courier profile failed to provide the
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify an investigative stop.'" The
stop, therefore, was held unconstitutional by the Court. 169
In Reid, a DEA agent observed the defendant, Reid, and another man proceed
separately through the Atlanta airport.'" The agent stopped these men because they
were exhibiting behavior consistent with the drug courier profile. 17 ' After identifying
himself, the agent asked each man to produce identification and airline ticket stubs.'"
The men did as requested.'" The airline ticket stubs showed that the tickets had been
purchased with the defendant's credit card and that the men had just returned from a
one-day trip to Fort Lauderdale.'" Having examined the stubs, the agent asked the men
whether they would return to the terminal for a search of their persons and bags. in They
agreed to accompany the agent, but as they entered the terminal with the agent, Reid
tried to run away.'" Before Reid was apprehended, he abandoned his shoulder bag. 177
The agent found cocaine in the bag.'"
The trial court granted Reid's motion to suppress, finding that the cocaine was
obtained as a result of a seizure not supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity,'" Holding that the defendant's matching of a number of characteristics in the
drug courier profile constituted the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the stop, the
Georgia Court of Appeals reversed.' 69 The appellate court concluded that Reid had
consented to return to the terminal and that his attempted flight had provided probable
cause to search the abandoned bag."'
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Georgia Court of Appeals.'" The
Reid Court viewed the drug courier profile much differently than the concurring opinion
in Mendenhall. 183 In Reid the Court described the profile as "a somewhat informal compila-
tion of characteristics believed to be typical of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics."'"
iErr 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam).
1" Id. at 440-41.
161)
170 Id. at 439.
in Id. For a list of the drug courier profile characteristics found in Reid, see supra note 28.
172 Reid, 448 U.S. at 439.
' 7' Id.
"A Id. Fort Lauderdale is considered a "source city" for cocaine. Id. Departing by plane from a
source city is considered one of the characteristics of the drug courier profile. Id. See supra note 16.





'° Id. at 439-40.
Id. at 440.
1" Id. at 441-42.
183 Id. at 441. In Mendenhall, the concurring Justices found the profile to be part of a "highly
specialized law enforcement operation." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 562 (Powell, J., concurring).
184 448 U.S. at 440-41.
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As a matter of law, the Reid Court found that the DEA agent could not have reasonably
suspected Reid of criminal activity based on the few profile characteristics the agent
observed.'"`' According to the Reid Court. three of the four profile characteristics observed
— departure from a known center of cocaine smuggling; time of arrival early in the day;
and lack of luggage other than a shoulder hag — were common to many innocent.
travelers.' 8" The Court reasoned that travelers would be subject to "virtually random
seizures" if the Court were to attach legal significance to these facts.'" The majority found
that the fourth observation relating to Reid's particular conduct where Reid walked in
front of his traveling companion and occasionally looked backward at him as they
proceeded through the concourse was "simply too slender a reed to support the seizure in
t his case."'" In sum, because the four - characteristics corresponding to the profile that the
defendant exhibited did not provide a sufficient basis for an investigative stop, the seizure
was deemed unconstitutional. 188
The three Justices who had concurred in Mendenhall — Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and Blackmun — also concurred in Reid.'" Justice Powell wrote his
concurring opinion to emphasize that in neither Mendenhall nor Reid had he considered
whether a seizure had taken place because it had not been raised in the courts below.'"
He instead assumed, as he had in Mendenhall, that a seizure had occurred.'" Justice
Powell dealt with the legality of the seizure only in a footnote.'" In this footnote, he
agreed with the majority that the seizure was invalid because "the fragmentary facts
apparently relied upon by the DEA agents in this case" did not. justify a seizure.'"
In Mendenhall, the Court. considered the constitutionality of seizing passengers on the
basis of their conformance with a drug courier profile, but failed to arrive at a conclusive
holding. One month later, in Reid, the Court rejected the notion that the agent's stopping
of Reid based solely on conformance with the profile was a seizure supported by reason-
able suspicion. Following these decisions, the lower federal courts, in reviewing drug
courier profile cases, arrived at inconsistent. holdings on the issue of whether the profile
provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop.'" Assuming
that an investigative stop of an airport. traveler by an agent. is a fourth amendment seizure,
the courts must. have some guidelines for determining a justification for that. seizure. The
Supreme Court once again had the opportunity to resolve the constitutionality of the





' 99 See id. at 442-43 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist dissented, finding that no seizure
had occurred and therefore no fourth amendment rights were violated. Id. at 442 (Rehnquist, 1.,
dissenting).
91 Id. at 442-43 (Powell, J., concurring).
1" Id. at 443 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell emphasized that he did not necessarily
disagree with Justice Stewart's standard formulated in Mendenhall of when a seizure had occurred,
but rather considered the issue open. Id.
' 93 Id. at 442 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
1 " Id.
j95
 For example, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Deggendorf, 626 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 986 (1980), found that the initial encounter with the defendant was a seizure
justified by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 51-2. The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Elsoffer, 671
F.2d 1294 (11th Cir. 1982), held that a seizure had occurred at the moment the defendant's ticket was






drug courier profile in providing reasonable suspicion in the recent. case of Florida v.
Royer. Instead, justice White's plurality opinion failed to address directly the specific
quantum of reasonable suspicion based on the drug courier profile needed to support an
investigative stop, and focused instead on the permissible scope of such a stop once it had
been initiated.
C. Florida v. Royer
In Florida v. Royer ,I 96 the Supreme Court reviewed a lower court's decision that
addressed the question of whether the initial stop based on the drug courier profile
constituted a seizure.'" A plurality of the Court rejected! I he view of the Florida District
Court that the drug courier profile is insufficient to provide the reasonable suspicion
necessary for an investigative stop."' The plurality opinion, which noted that all of the
characteristics exhibited by Royer were included in the drug courier profile, did not
articulate any other basis from which reasonable suspicion could be derived.'" Even
though the Court found that the facts included in the drug courier profile created
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, t he Court held t hat the subsequent police intru-
sion was a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than is allowable on mere
suspicion of criminal activity.'" Consequently, the plurality found that Royer's consent
was tainted by the illegal detention and was ineffective to justify the search.'"
The events in Royer began at the Miami International Airport in I978. 212 Two
plainclothes law enforcement officers 2"3 approached Royer, the defendant, at Miami
International Airport after t heir observations indicated that he fit a drug courier profile,
which had been developed in conjunction with the DEA profile on alleged drug
couriers.'" The officers stopped Royer in the airport concourse and identified themselves
as police officers.` U5 They asked him if he would be willing to speak with them.'"" Upon
request, but without oral consent, the officers obtained Royer's driver's license and airline
ticket.'" Examination revealed that the license and the ticket. bore different names. 2 "8
When the officers questioned Royer about the discrepancy, he became nervous.L 1" At this
point, the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents and informed Royer that they
146 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
'"7 Id. at 493 (plurality opinion).
' 98 Id. at 495 -96 n.7 (plurality opinion).
'" Id. at 502 (plurality opinion).
'"" Id. at 503 (plurality opinion). Royer is also valuable because it carves out the territory for the
investigative stop originating in Terry and Adams. For a discussion of Terry and Adams, see supra notes
79-96 and accompanying text.
201 460 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion).
2 °2 Id. at 493 (plurality opinion).
"3 The detectives were from the Dade Count y, Florida public safely department assigned to the
county's organized crime bureau. Id.
21° For a list of the drug courier profile characteristics that attracted the officers' attention, see
supra note 32. For a discussion of the drug courier profile developed by the DEA, see supra notes
12 -21 and accompanying text.
zo, 460 U.S. at 493-94 (plurality opinion).
2116 Id. at 494 (plurality opinion).
207 Id .
2"' The airline ticket taken by the officers bore the name "Holt," while the driver's license bore
his real name "Royer." Id.
209 Id. Royer's explanation of the discrepancy was that his friend had made the reservation in the
name of "Holt." Id.
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suspected him of transporting narcotics." The officers, still retaining both the airline
ticket and driver's license, then asked Royer to accompany them to a small private
office."' Royer complied with the request.'" Meanwhile, without Royer's consent, one of
the officers retrieved Royer's two suitcases from the baggage claim area and brought the
luggage to the office." In the office, the detectives, upon receiving Royer's consent,'"
opened the two suitcases. 2" After finding a total of sixty-five pounds of marijuana in the
two suitcases, the officers placed Royer under arrest. 216 Filteen minutes had elapsed from
the time the agents initially stopped Royer until his arrest upon discovery of the
marijuana.'"
At Royer's trial for felony possession of marijuana, the prosecution attempted to
introduce the evidence obtained in the search of the suitcases." Royer made a motion to
suppress this evidence that the trial court denied, finding no violation of the fourth
amendment.' The trial court found that Royer's consent to the search had been volun-
tary and was thus valid."° Even if the consent had not been valid, the trial court stated, the
search was nonetheless constitutional because the officers' conduct toward Royer had
been reasonable.'" The trial continued and Royer was ultimately convicted. 222
Royer appealed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress to the district court
of appeals.'" This intermediate appellate court, sitting en banc, reversed the conviction
holding that the airport search had violated the fourth amendment."' The appeals court
held that Royer had been involuntarily confined within the room without probable cause,
and that the involuntary detention had exceeded the limited restraint permissible during




112 Id. Royer did not orally reply to this request but nonetheless accompanied the agents. Id.
213 The two suitcases contained an identification tag bearing only the name "Holt" and the
destination "La Guardia." Id. Royer did not explain why these tags, as well as his airline ticket, bore
the name "Holt." Id. The room to which Royer accompanied the agents, approximately forty feet
away, adjacent to the concourse, was later described by one of the narcotic agents as a "large storage
closet" located in the stewardesses' lounge and containing shelves, a small desk and two chairs. Id.
"4 Royer was asked if he would consent to the search of the two pieces of luggage. Id. at 494
(plurality opinion). Although he said nothing, he produced a key and unlocked one of the suitcases,
in which marijuana was found. id. When asked if he objected to a search of the second suitcase, Royer
replied in the negative but told the narcotic agents that he did not know the combination to the lock
on the suitcase. Id. at 494-95 (plurality opinion). The agent then asked Royer if they could break it
open. Id. Royer did not object. Id.










222 Id. Following the denial of the motion to suppress, Royer changed his plea from "not guilty"
to "nolo contendere." Id. By pleading "nolo contendere," which is in effect equivalent to pleading
guilty, Royer was able to reserve the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Id. Royer
was sentenced to two years of probation with a thirty-day jail sentence imposed as a condition of the
probation. Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1008 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), aff'd, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
223 460 U.S. at 495 (plurality opinion).
224 Id. The case was reheard en banc. Id. at 495 n.6 (plurality opinion).
221 Id. at 495 (plurality opinion).
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poisonous tree" doctrine, 226
 the evidence gathered pursuant to Royer's consent was
tainted by the unlawful confinement. 227
 The appeals court concluded that the drug
courier profile alone was insufficient to establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to
justify an investigative stop. 228
Upon the reversal of Royer's conviction by the appeals court, the State of Florida filed
a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which granted the
petition. 229 A fragmented Court affirmed the Florida appeals court's decision reversing
Royer's conviction. 230 A majority among the plurality and dissenters held that the initial
stop had not been a seizure:13 ' This majority further held that once the stop had become a
seizure, reasonable suspicion had existed to justify the investigative stop. 22' A different
majority of justices found that at some point after the initial stop, the officers' seizure had
matured into an arrest unsupported by probable cause. 233 Thus, according to this second
majority of Justices, Royer's consent and the consequent search were tainted by this illegal
arrest, 234
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, wrote the plurality
opinion. 235 Justice White began his analysis with a set of "preliminary observations"
covering a variety of principles applicable to investigative stops for questioning:23' First,
Justice White explained that consent was necessary to search Royer's luggage. 237 In
reaching this conclusion, Justice White reasoned that since no warrant, no probable cause,
or no exigent circumstances existed to search Royer's luggage, the validity of the search
depended on Royer's consent.' Justice White noted that the government bore the
burden of proving that this consent was freely and voluntarily given: 239 This burden of
demonstrating consent was not satisfied, Justice White stated, by a mere showing that the
defendant submitted to perceived lawful authority where the defendant felt he had no
choice.'"
Continuing with his discussion of preliminary observations, Justice White outlined
220 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine.
"7 460 U.S. at 495 (plurality opinion).
114 Id. at 495 n.7 (plurality opinion). The court dismissed such profiles as little more than
"neutral" factors which point to innocence as readily as guilt, 389 So. 2d at 1019.
229 See 454 U.S. 1079 (1981).
230 Justice White delivered the plurality opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens
joined. 480 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell also authored a concurring opinion. Id. at
508 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in the result only. Id. at 509
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 513 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist filed a separate dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justice O'Connor joined. Id. at 519 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
231 Id. at 501 (plurality opinion); id. at 513-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 523 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was the only member of the Court who found that the initial stop was
unlawful. See id. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 502 (plurality opinion); id. at 523 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 503 (plurality opinion); id. at 509 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 509 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
234 Id. at 507-08 (plurality opinion); id. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring).
233
	
at 493-508 (plurality opinion).
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the three categories of police-citizen encounters."' The first. category, he discussed, the
approach and questioning of a willing person in a public place, does not fall under fourth
amendment scrutiny. 242 Justice White emphasized that law enforcement officers do not
violate the fourth amendment by merely stopping a person and asking him a few
questions, assuming the person is willing to listen. 243 The answers obtained from this type
of encounter, the plurality noted, may be offered in evidence in a criminal prosecution. 244
Having established that this mere questioning of an individual does not convert the
encounter into a seizure requiring objective justification, Justice White cautioned that
under a nonseizure encounter the individual must be free to leave the questioner at any
i me ,245
The second category of police-citizen encounters set forth by Justice White involved
the brief investigative stop of an individual." 6 These stops qualify as seizures, Justice
White noted, and satisfy fourth amendment strictures "if' there is articulatable suspicion
that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime." 247 The Terry decision, Justice
White stated, had created this limited exception to the general rule that. any seizure of a
person was invalid unless justified by probable cause. 2" Justice White suggested that an
important public interest in the seizure of drug smugglers occasioned this exception. 249
This public interest, however, Justice White cautioned, needed to he carefully balanced
against. the desire to prevent unwarranted intrusion into personal security.""
The third category of police-citizen encounters Justice White discussed involved
those seizures more intrusive than an investigative stop."' These encounters, explained
Justice White, amounted to a full scale arrest and were valid only if supported by probable
cause. 252 Justice White cautioned that Terry v. Ohio and its progeny in permitting the
investigative stop had created an extremely limited exception to the general rule against
seizures of persons without probable cause."' This exception, according to Justice White,
must he limited to avoid approaching the conditions of an arrest."'
Justice White then noted that, although the exigent circumstances provide justifica-
tion for a warrantless search, if these investigative stops are based on reasonable suspicion
"' Id. at 497 -99 (plurality opinion).
242 Id. at 497 -98. This is the category one police -citizen encounter, discussed supra notes 45 -47
and accompanying text.
249
	 U.S. at 497-98 (plurality opinion).
244 Id. at 497 (plurality opinion).
24 ' Id. at 498 (plurality opinion).
"" Id. at 498-99 (plurality opinion). This is t he category two police -citizen encounter, discussed
supra notes 48-50 and 79-93 and accompanying text. This part of Justice White's opinion clearly
carves out the area of police-citizen encounters first established in 'ferry and Adams. For a discussion
of Terry and Adams, see supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
242 460 U.S. at 498 (plurality opinion).
"" Id. at 499 (plurality opinion).
24" Id. at 499-500 (plurality opinion).
2"' Id. at 500 (plurality opinion).




 460 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion).
259
254 Id. Justice White based this proposition on Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 20{) (1979). In
that case, a suspect had not been formally arrested, yet was taken to a police station and interrogated
for an hour. Id. at 203. The Dunaway Court held that the incriminating statements were inadmissible
because this investigative stop was too intrusive. Id. at 207.
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rather than probable cause, the scope of the intrusion must nevertheless be tailored to the
justification of the stop:255 Specific limits to the scope of the investigative stop were not set
forth by Justice White because he reasoned that the scope of the intrusion permitted will
vary with the particular facts and circumstances of the case. 23s Justice White did, however,
set forth two general rules governing the permissible scope of the intrusion."' First,
justice White reasoned, an investigative detention, "must be temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the stop."' Second, "the investigative
methods," Justice White stated, "should be the least intrusive means reasonably available
to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." 259
Having set forth the three categories of police-citizen encounters, Justice White next.
articulated the principle that tainted evidence is inadmissible. 2" Specifically, Justice White
noted, if an individual is illegally detained and gives a voluntary statement, the statement
is nonetheless inadmissible because it is the product. of the illegal detention and not the
result of an independent act of free
Applying these principles to the facts before it, the plurality upheld the appeals
court's reversal of Royer's conviction. 262 Royer's consent. to the search had been invalid,
Justice White explained, because it was given during an illegal seizure.'" The seizure,
reasoned Justice White, had been illegal because the bounds of a permissible investigative
stop had been exceeded.'" The stop had matured into an arrest unsupported by probable
cause:263 Thus, according to Justice White, Royer's consent and the consequent search
were tainted by this illegal arrest, 266
In finding that the investigative stop was supported by reasonable suspicion but that
the bounds of the investigative stop had been exceeded, Justice White addressed three
arguments advanced by the stale to support the officers' actions. 267 Justice White found
"untenable" the state's first argument that the entire encounter was consensual. 2"e While
agreeing t hat the officers' conduct in taking Royer's license and ticket was not a seizure,
Justice White nevertheless found that a seizure occurred once the officers identified
themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer they suspected him of transporting drugs, and
asked hitn to accompany them to the DEA .office. 0 "9 Justice White reasoned that these
actions by the police constituted a seizure because they amounted to a "show of official












267 Id. at 501-07 (plurality opinion).
26" Id. at 501 (plurality opinion).
m Id. Justice White noted: "Asking for and examining Royer's ticket and his driver's license
were no doubt permissible in themselves, but when the officers identified themselves as narcotics
agents, told Royer that he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany
them to the police room, while retaining his ticket and driver's license and without indicating in any
way that he was free to depart, Royer was effectively seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."
Id.
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authority such that a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave."'"
Next, Justice White dismissed the state's contention that even if Royer had been
seized, reasonable suspicion existed to justify the investigative stop and that the en-
counter, therefore, had not amounted to an arrest. 27 ' Justice White agreed with the state
that reasonable suspicion existed to detain Royer based on the characteristics listed in the
drug courier profile.'" Justice White agreed that adequate grounds for suspecting Royer
of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him were established by the officers'
discovery that Royer was traveling under an assumed name, together with the facts
already known to the officers — the fact that Royer paid cash for a one-way ticket, the
method of checking his luggage, and Royer's appearance and conduct in general. 273
Justice White found, however, that when Royer produced his key to the suitcases, in
response to the officers' request, the detention exceeded the scope of an investigative stop
permitted by Terry. 274
In ruling that the bounds of the investigative stop had been exceeded, Justice White
also found that the law enforcement officers' conduct toward Royer was more intrusive
than necessary during the investigative detention.'" No reason existed, Justice White
stated, to move Royer from the concourse to the DEA office.^ 7" The removal of Royer to
the office, Justice White found, served no purpose other than to change the nature of the
police-citizen encounter from an investigative stop to a full-scale arrest.'" Justice White
articulated three alternative police procedures that could have made the detention
legal. 278 First, Justice White noted that the encounter would have been consensual if the
officers had returned Royer's driver's license and airplane ticket and informed him that
he was free to g0. 276 Second, Justice White suggested that moving Royer from the
concourse to the office would not have turned the investigative stop into an arrest if the
purpose of the move was safety and security of either the officers or the public. 280 Third,
Justice White noted that the use of a dog trained to discover drugs might have been
feasible and less intrusive than opening Royer's luggage."' Justice White reasoned that if
the dog had not reacted to Royer or his luggage then Royer could have left immedi-
ateiy.282 If
,
 on the other hand, the dog had smelled something suspicious, then sufficient
probable cause would have existed to justify an arrest: 483
After finding that the officers' conduct was too intrusive, Justice White rejected the
state's final argument that Royer had not been illegally detained because probable cause
to arrest him existed by the time he gave his consent to t he search of his luggage.'" The




"4 Id. at 502-03 (plurality opinion).
376
	at 504 (plurality opinion).
276 Id. at 504 -05 (plurality opinion).
277 Id. at 505 (plurality opinion).
278 Id. at 505-06 (plurality opinion).
279 Id. at 504 (plurality opinion).
260 Id. at 504.05 (plurality opinion).
281 Id. at 505 -06, 505 n.10 (plurality opinion).
"2 Id. at 506 (plurality opinion).
263 Id.
Y6' Id. at 507 (plurality opinion).
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plurality found insufficient probable cause upon the facts surrounding the police-citizen
encounter.'" Justice White reasoned that the observation of a nervous young man with
two heavy suitcases who paid cash for an airline ticket to a target city, which led to an
inquiry that revealed that the ticket had been purchased under an assumed name, did not
supply probable cause for the arrest.'"
Justice White, in sum, explicitly endorsed the use of the three-tier theory of the
fourth amendment. Finding that the officers' stop was a second-tier police-citizen en-
counter — an investigative stop — Justice White determined that the DEA officers had
adequate grounds for suspecting Royer of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining
him and his luggage to verify or dispel their suspicions. 297 Justice White did not mention
explicitly that the drug courier profile provided the reasonable suspicion. The charac-
teristics cited by Justice White that gave rise to the reasonable suspicion, however, are all
listed in the profile.'" Justice White gave no other indication that other characteristics
existed to support the reasonable suspicion. Justice White concluded, however, that the
seizure of Royer's airline ticket, driver's license, and luggage, when considered with his
detention in a small office and the failure of the officers to inform him that he was free to
go, exceeded the permissible limits of an investigative stop. 299 Consequently, according to
Justice White, the police-citizen encounter amounted to a full scale arrest, unaccom-
panied by probable cause and, therefore, violated the fourth amendment:45° Royer's
subsequent consent to the search of his luggage, Justice White further concluded, was
tainted by this illegality:29 '
Two Justices wrote concurring opinions in Royer. Justice Powell, a member of the
Royer plurality, wrote a concurring opinion simply "to repeat that the public has a
compelling interest in identifying by all lawful means those who traffic in illicit drugs for
personal profit." 292 Justice Powell emphasized that police-citizen encounters in airports
warrant special consideration because airlines are a major means of drug trafficking and
because the agents who stop the suspects are highly skilled in detecting drug traffickers:29a
Justice Powell also found that these encounters warrant special consideration because the
officers are guided by the drug courier profile. 294 Although Justice Powell did not
explicitly find that the drug courier profile had provided reasonable suspicion to justify
stopping Royer, he endorsed its use, finding the characteristics that make up the profile
relevant in identifying drug smugglers. 295
justice Brennan, concurring only in the result, agreed with the plurality that at some
point the actions of the police exceeded the bounds of an investigative stop, but disagreed
that the initial stop was not a seizure:295 Justice Brennan found instead that this seizure
was an investigative stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion. 297 On finding the initial
2" Id.
288 Id.
287 Id. at 502 (plurality opinion).
383 Id. See supra note 32 for a list of the characteristics.
"8 460 U.S. at 502-03 (plurality opinion).
88° Id. at 507 (plurality opinion).
"I Id. at 507-08 (plurality opinion).
292 Id. at 508-09 (Powell, J., concurring).
"3 Id. at 508 (Powell, J., concurring).
2" Id.
2" Id.
2" Id. at 509-13 (Brennan, J., concurring).
297 Id. at 509-11 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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contact illegal, Justice Brennan emphasized that he did not consider all police-citizen
encounters seizures.'" justice Brennan argued, however, that in this case Royer was
impermissibly seized when the police identified themselves and asked for Royer's driver's
license and airline ticket."" According to Justice Brennan, a seizure had occurred at this
point because the officers had engaged in a "show of authority" and had restrained
Royer's liberty."' Royer, reasoned Justice Brennan, could not have felt free to walk away
once these events had occurred."'
Having established that Royer was seized during the initial contact, Justice Brennan
noted that to justify such a seizure, "an officer must have a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity based on 'specific and articulatable facts.' "303 Using this standard, justice
Brennan suggested that the facts upon which the officers relied in first approaching
Royer, all of which were contained in the drug courier profile, failed to provide the
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify a seizure. 303 Justice Brennan
objected to the use of these particular profile characteristics as the basis for reasonable
suspicion because he believed that the characteristics either considered together or indi-
vidually were consistent with innocent behavior. 364
Justice Blackmun, writing one of the two dissenting opinions in Royer, agreed with
the plurality that a seizure had occurred, although he did not identify the exact point. 305
Justice Blackmun also agreed that no probable cause existed when the officers opened the
suitcases, but he found the seizure valid based on the existence of reasonable suspicion."'
In reaching this finding, Justice Blackmun stated that probable cause was not necessary in
an airport drug trafficking case such as the one in Royer."7 Justice Blackmun reached this
conclusion after balancing the competing interests involved. 308 According to Justice
Blackmun, on one side of the balance rests the desire to minimize the intrusion upon an
individual's privacy, 3" and on the other side rests the special law enforcement interest in
permitting such an intrusion to prevent illegal actions that would otherwise go unde-
tected. 311 In weighing these competing interests, Justice Blackmun found that probable
399
	
at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring).
299 Id.
333 Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., concurring).
307 Id. at 512 (Brennan, J., concurring).
3°t
	 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 21 (1968).
303 id.
3" Id. The characteristics that Justice Brennan considered to be consistent with innocent behav-
ior were those found solely in the profile on which the officers relied upon in stopping Royer. These
characteristics included that Royer was carrying heavy suitcases; that he was young: that he was
casually dressed; that he was pale, nervous, and looked around at other people; that he paid cash for
his airline ticket with small bills; and that he did not completely fill out his luggage identification
cards. Id.
'Gs Id. at 513-19 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting). Justice Blackmun concurred in the Court's
adoption of the fourth amendment seizure standard used by Justice Stewart in Mendenhall. d. at 514
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3" Id. at 519 (Blackmun , 	 dissenting). In reaching this conclusion, Justice Blackmun relied on
the Court's treatment of automobile stops. Id. at 515-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He distinguished
this case from Dunaway, where a suspect was taken From his neighbor's home and involuntarily
transported to the police station in a police car. Id. Royer was stopped in a major international airport
which Justice Blackmun reasoned held a lesser magnitude of privacy than a home. Id. at 518
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"7 Id. at 519 (Blackmun. J., dissenting).
308 Id. at 518 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3" Id.
319
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cause was not necessary because of society's strong interest in overcoming the obstacles in
detecting drug I rafficking. 3 "
Justice Blackmun did recognize that as an encounter proceeds, a greater degree of
reasonable suspicion is needed to justify continuing the stop. 3" In this case, however,
Justice Blackmun suggested that a greater degree of reasonable suspicion was not neces-
sary due to the short length of the detention and the politeness of the officers, as well as
Royer's consent to the office detention and the search. 3 ' 3 Justice Blackmun, however, did
not articulate the basis for the reasonable suspicion. 34 Although the police-citizen en-
counter in Royer was based on the drug courier profile, Justice Blackmun never men-
tioned the profile's relevance in airport drug stops. 315 To the extent, however, that all the
characteristics displayed by Royer were part of the profile, and Justice Blackmun found
that these characteristics provided reasonable suspicion, it can be assumed that he be-
lieved the profile in this case provided reasonable suspicion to justify the stop.
Justice Rehnquist, writing a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice O'Connor,"" agreed with the plurality that when the police officers first ap-
prehended Royer no seizure occurred."" Justice Rehnquist also agreed that the facts
known to the officers provided reasonable suspicion to support the investigative stop. 3 's
Justice Rehnquist disagreed, however, that the officers' conduct following the initial
conversation with Royer was unreasonable. 319 The entire police-citizen encounter, accord-
ing to Justice Rehnquist, was therefore lawful under the fourth amendment.. 32"
In reaching the conclusion that the seizure was valid, Justice Rehnquist expressly
approved the use of the drug courier profile. 32 ' In a lengthy footnote, justice Rehnquist.
stated that the use of the drug courier profile to establish reasonable suspicion is part of
an officer's accumulated knowledge and is not amenable to the bright-line rule proposed
by the Florida court. 3" Justice Rehnquist stressed that the determination must. he made
on a case-by-case basis considering the totality of the circumstances. 323
In sum, a plurality of the Court in Florida v. Royer relied on and expanded the
three-tier theory of the fourth amendment. 324 A majority of the Court found that the stop
of Royer, which was considered a second-tier investigative stop, was supported by the
requisite amount of reasonable suspicion. 325 The plurality opinion in Royer expressed its
3E1 Id .
312
3" Id. at 518-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31.4 Id .
3" Id. at 513-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3" Id. at 519-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3" Id. at 523 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist did not discuss the probable cause
issue here because he found that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to justify the detention.ld. at
523-25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
319 Id. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated: "Analyzed simply in terms of
`reasonableness' as the term is used in the Fourth Amendment, the conduct of the investigating
officers toward Royer would pass muster with virtually all thoughtful, civilized persons not overly
steeped in the mysteries of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id.
3" Id. at 530 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" 1 Id. at 525 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3" Id. The state court had concluded that conformity . with the drug courier profile, "without
more," is insufficient to establish even reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See id.
325 Id.
3" Id. at 497-99 (plurality opinion).
3" Id. at 502 (plurality opinion); id. at 523 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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approval of the characteristics of the profile present in Royer by rejecting the view of the
Florida District Court of Appeals, that behavior matching the characteristics found in the
profile is insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion."' The plurality, which noted that
all the characteristics exhibited by Royer were found in the profile, did not articulate any
other basis from which reasonable suspicion could have been derived."' Justice Re-
hnquist, dissenting, also found that possession of these particular characteristics provided
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. 3" Although a majority found the profile sufficient
to provide reasonable suspicion, no opinion articulated the number of profile characteris-
tics necessary to provide the necessary level of suspicion of criminal activity to justify an
investigative stop of a suspected drug smuggler at an airport. 3 L 9
IV. THE DRUG COURIER PROFILE AND DETERMINING REASONABLE SUSPICION
Whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify the stops in Mendenhall, Reid, and
Royer was determined by the presence of elements of the drug courier profile. 339 In all
three cases, the suspects were singled out by law enforcement agents because they
matched a profile. Beyond the fact that the behavior of the defendants Mendenhall, Reid
and Royer conformed to certain characteristics found in a profile, nothing else provided
reasonable suspicion.
In Mendenhall, the defendant attracted the attention of the agents based on four
characteristics found in the drug courier profile. First, the defendant arrived in Detroit
from Los Angeles, a "source" city. Second, Mendenhall was the last to deplane and had a
nervous appearance. Third, she claimed no baggage, and fourth, Mendenhall changed
airplanes for a flight out of Detroit, 33 ' Three Justices in Mendenhall found reasonable
suspicion based on these characteristics to justify an investigative stop of' the suspected
drug stnuggler, 3" four justices disagreed, 333 and two never reached the question. 334 The
defendant in Reid was stopped by an agent because his behavior matched four drug
courier profile characteristics. First, the defendant arrived from a source city. Second, he
arrived at a time of diminished law enforcement activity — early morning. Third, Reid
attempted to conceal that. he was traveling with another person, and fourth, he checked
no baggage. 333 In Reid a majority of the Court refused to acknowledge that these profile
31''
	 at 493 (plurality opinion).
3" Id. at 502 (plurality opinion).
'28 Id. at 523 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3Y9 After Royer, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980, 989 (8th Cir. 1983),
concluded that reasonable suspicion existed for a stop when the suspect who was circumstantially
linked to a recent drug shipment, (raveled under false identity, acted nervous, and did not claim his
luggage at the airport. See also United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Itazi, 563 F. Supp. 730 (D. Minn. 1983).
33° Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547-48 & n.1 (plurality opinion); Reid, 448 U.S. at 441-42; Royer, 460
U.S. at 502 (plurality opinion).
33
 446 U.S, at 547 n.1 (plurality opinion).
332 Id. at 563-64 (Powell J., concurring). Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun.
' Id. at 564 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's dissent was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens,
334 Id. at 546 (Stewart, J., minority opinion in part). Justice Stewart was joined by Justice
Rehnquist.
3" 448 U.S. at 439.
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characteristics provided reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative stop. 33" Six factors
found in the drug courier profile caused the agents to stop Royer. First, he carried heavy
suitcases of the type commonly used by drug smugglers. Second, he was nervous and
looked around as though he were looking for police. Third, the defendant paid cash for
his airline ticket. Fourth, he did not write a full name and address on his baggage. Fifth,
Royer was young, and sixth, he was casually dressed. 337 In Royer, a majority of the Court.
fbund that possession of these particular characteristics provided reasonable suspicion to
justify the stop.'"
A comparison of the Mendenhall, Reid, and Royer profiles reveals that there is no single
profile used nationwide. 339 In fact, not only do profile .elements vary front one law
enforcement agency to another, they also vary from airport: to airport."'" Alt hough the
profile characteristics in these cases vary, it is possible to hypothesize what. combination of
characteristics are necessary to provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify
an investigative slop. This final section, by comparing the profile characteristics in Men-
denhall, Reid, and Royer, will articulate which elements of the drug courier profile appar-
ently must. be present in a given case to justify an investigative stop of a suspected drug
smuggler.
In Mendenhall, since a majority of the Court never reached the seizure issue, they had
no occasion to discuss whether the drug courier profile, either alone or in combination
with other factors, provides reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative siop. 34 ' Three
members of the majority in a separate concurring opinion did, however, examine the
propriety of using the profile and seemingly gave their approval of this technique."'
Justice Powell, in writing his concurring opinion provided a detailed analysis of the
Supreme Court's view on the drug courier profile. 343 The profile was regarded by Justice
Powell as a sophisticated law enforcement technique worthy of judicial deference."'
Justice Powell accepted the characteristics constituting the profile as being relevant to
establish reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. 345 Justice Powell also accepted, without
question, the agents conclusions regarding the suspect's nervousness and that the suspect
was scanning the area for the purpose of detecting drug enforcement officers."'" Justice
Powell considered no other rationale for the suspect's behavior.
If the Court adopted Justice Powell's approach to evaluating the drug courier profile
characteristics, then the Courts analysis of these cases would not involve an examination
of the factors found in the profile itself. The Court would assume wit hout question that
the factors found in the profile were relevant in detecting criminal behavior. The focus of
Id. at 441.
"" 460 U.S. at 493 n.2 (plurality opinion).
a3" Id at 502 (plurality opinion); id. at 523 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"" Mendenhall, for example was approached. in part because she claimed no baggage, while
Royer was approached in part because of the kind of luggage he carried.
34" See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
"' See SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 35, 36 (1980) (Mendenhall Court did not resolve profile issue
because two members of the majority found that no fourth amendment seizure had occurred).
3" 446 U.S. at 565 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring) (agents had reasonable suspicion to stop particu-
lar defendant because agents could reasonably associate defendane. ,  observed conduct with criminal
activity). .
3" Id. at 563-65 (Powell, J., concurring).
344 Id. at 564 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 564-65 (Powell, J., concurring).
3 4 " Id. at 565 (Powell, J., concurring).
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the analysis would then center on whether the combination of t hose factors presented was
enough to establish suspicion.
Although the concurring Justices in Mendenhall accepted the profile characteristics at
face value, they did indicate that these characteristics might not in all cases, provide
reasonable suspicion. 3" This statement was predictive of [he Court's future actions. These
same Justices, concurring in the per curiam opinion in Reid, found that the lour factors
presented there that were part of the profile were insufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion. 3411 T he Court.statecf that. the agents' observation that Reid's behavior matched
the courier characteristics of trying to conceal that he was traveling with another person
was a "hunch," not a "fair inference," and was at any rate, "too slender a reed to support.
the seizure in this case." 3" The Court discounted the other three characteristics — t.ravel
from a source city, arrival at a time of diminished law enforcement activity, and no
checked baggage — on the ground that these characteristics did not relate to Reid's
"particular conduct.."'"" This result suggests that the Court. will assess profiles in a two-step
process. The first. step is to determine if the profile characteristics are particularized so
that the police can differentiate the suspect from innocent travelers. The court then
discounts those factors that are not particular to a given suspect, as it did in Reid. lii step
two, the Court determines whether the particularized factors fairly support the reason-
able suspicion to justify an investigative stop. The Reid Court established that the one
particular characteristic — at tempting to conceal travel with another person — along with
(he other three non particularized characteristics did not satisfy the test of reasonable
suspicion.
In Royer, five additional Justices joined the Mendenhall plurality in finding that the
profile characteristics exhibited by Royer provided reasonable suspicion to justify the
second tier police-citizen encounter — an investigative stop. 33 ' These Justices from both
the plurality and dissenting opinions established that the combination of profile charac-
teristics found in Royer satisfied the requirement of reasonable suspicion. Significantly, t he
plurality did not explicitly overrule its earlier decision in Reid when it handed down Royer.
By not overruling Reid, a majority of the Court has set a minimum number of particular
characteristics of the profile that will provide reasonable suspicion to justify an investiga-
tive stop. A drug courier profile stop, where only one characteristic relates to particular
conduct, such as the one in Reid, will not be enough to satisfy the requirement of
reasonable suspicion to justify die stop.
These three cases, therefore, have not explicitly articulated t hose characteristics of
the profile that provide reasonable suspicion. Based on [he three decisions, however - ,
speculating about which factors might provide reasonable suspicion to stop an individual
for investigative questioning in an airport is possible. In order to draw any inferences
from these cases, a comparison of the characteristics of the profile that led t he police to
stop the suspect in each case is necessary. The following characteristic of the profile was
347 Id. at 565 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
3" 448 U.S. at 440-41.
319 Id. at 44 I.
1.'" Id.
1" As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent, while the plurality did not address the use of the
drug courier profile in narcotics investigations, it affirmed a decision of the Florida District Court of
Appeals which fashioned a "bright line rule that conformity with such a profile, without more, is
insufficient to establish even reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is about." 460 U.S. at 525 n.6
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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present in both Mendenhall and Reid: arrival front a source city."' In addition to this
common element four additional factors were present in Mendenhall. Specifically, the
factors found in Mendenhall but not in Reid were that the suspect. in Mendenhall was the last
to deplane, scanned the entire area, appeared "very nervous," and changed airlines
during her trip. 353 In comparison, the factors in Reid not found in Mendenhall were that
the suspect in Reid arrived early in the morning and tried to conceal the existence of a
traveling companion."" From these two cases it is arguable that the defendant's particular
conduct of nervousness and scanning of the airport concourse in Mendenhall are the
characteristics that might have made the difference in the Mendenhall plurality's assess-
ment of what constitutes reasonable suspicion. The remaining factors in Mendenhall not
found in Reid — being last to deplane and changing airlines — are arguably consistent
with innocent behavior. Since these characteristics do not relate to a person's particular
conduct, they do not provide an officer with additional suspicion of criminal behavior. 01
the three characteristics found in Reid but. not Mendenhall — arrival it a time of di-
minished law enforcement activity, failure to check baggage, and concealment of travel
with another person — only the last characteristic is related to t he suspect's particular
conduct. This characteristic standing alone was not sufficient to justify the stop.
Royer adds little to the analysis of what combination of profile characteristics provides
reasonable suspicion. One conclusion that can be reached is that if the suspect possesses
the characteristics present in both Mendenhall and Royer, reasonable suspicion would exist.
Specifically, if an agent stops a suspected drug smuggler who has the characteristics of
Mendenhall — arriving from a source city, being last to deplane, claiming no baggage,
and changing airplanes"' — plus the characteristics of Royer — carrying heavy suitcases,
paying cash for an airplane ticket, not writing full name on baggage, being young and
casually dressed — combined with the common factor of nervousness, reasonable suspi-
cion would he established."' Finally, if Reid's two-step process is applied, the only particu-
lar conduct found in Mendenhall and Royer is nervousness. This particular characteristic
alone, like the one particular characteristic in Reid — concealing travel with another
person — will not in itself provide reasonable suspicion. Nonetheless, nervousness is the
one characteristic found in Royer and Mendenhall but. not in Reid. Since the Mendenhall
plurality and the Royer majority upheld the use of a profile where nervousness was a
characteristic, and Reid disallowed the use of a profile where nervousness was lacking,
nervousness appears to be the one element that the court has determined must. he
present, along with other factors, in all cases.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has rendered three decisions on the constitutional
validity of the drug courier profile. All three cases involve the investigation of suspected
drug smugglers who were stopped by drug agents in airports because their behavior
matched a drug courier profile. After the Royer decision, the validity of a stop of a
suspected drug smuggler will be evaluated by the Court using a three-tier framework.
The first tier consists of police-citizen encounters that are so minimally intrusive that they
352 Reid, 448 U.S. at 441; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547 n.1 (plurality opinion).
3" Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547 n.1 (plurality opinion).
354 Reid, 448 U.S. at 44 1.
35' Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547 11.1 (plurality opinion).
353 460 U.S. at 493 n.2 (plurality opinion).
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do not rise to the level of a fourth amendment. seizure. The second tier consists of seizures
less intrusive than a full arrest that are supported by reasonable suspicion, a standard
lower than probable cause. The third tier consists of those seizures which are so intrusive,
such as an arrest, that probable cause as determined by a magistrate, or in exigent
circumstances, by the police themselves, is required. The focus of this note has been on
the use of drug courier profile to uphold the second tier of police-citizen encounters —
the investigative stop.
Mendenhall, Reid, and Royer established that while particular investigations based
upon drug courier profiles may be invalidated by the Court, it is unlikely the Court will
find that the use of the profile in and of itself is unconstitutional. The Court, however, has
not established what characteristics found in the profile will establish reasonable suspi-
cion. Moreover, because t he profile varies from case to case, the Court will not draw any
bright. lines in determining which combinations of characteristics provide reasonable
suspicion and which combinations do not. As this note demonstrates, the validity of
profile use will depend on whether the combination of particular conduct along with the
discounted nonparticularized conduct. establishes reasonable suspicion.
SHARON R. CHARDAK
